In 2003 seven teenagers perished as a result of an avalanche while ski touring in British Columbia during an annual school-sponsored trip. As a result of the tragedy, an after-action report was commissioned, which made various recommendations and conclusions.

Many of the report’s conclusions bear mention, as being applicable to outdoor program activities conducted by Scout units, as follows:

  • Focusing too much attention on the benefits of a program may not give sufficient attention to the risks associated with the program.
  • When youth engage in activities where the level of risk is uncontrollable or unpredictable, they leave the domain of perceived risk and enter the domain of real risk. 
  • If an organization determines that it is the arbiter of the level of risk tolerance to be accepted, then it assumes a higher duty to clearly communicate to parents what the activities are and the level of risk expected to be encountered.  Parents must then decide whether they can live with such risk.  This is the difference between “outdoor education” and “adventure education”. 
  • Risks associated with school sports may result in injuries that are well understood and accepted, as opposed to injuries that may occur in outdoor education activities, which may be catastrophic.
  • Driving a vehicle includes socially accepted risks, which are mitigated by speed limits, traffic rules, seat belts, airbags, and policing. 
  • Many parents were under the impression that the school would not engage in activities that might include high levels of risk.
  • Peer pressure can affect the decision-making ability of a student or parent when it comes to deciding what level of risk to accept.
  • School-based outdoor education programs must balance their calendar against numerous other school and family-based calendars, making it difficult to cancel or reschedule an activity, creating an incentive to proceed with an activity that otherwise should be canceled.
  • It is possible to become complacent and let the historic use of a venue or the conduct of an activity override analytical decision-making in the present.
  • The fact that recreation or commercial providers conduct an activity (canoeing, rafting, etc.) at a certain venue may tend to give a school-based outdoor education program an unjustifiable sense of confidence that the same program is appropriate for its students. 
  • The more risk an outdoor education program entails, the more onus is on the program provider to fully inform parents.
  • School-based programs and commercial outdoor program providers work toward different ends and operate under different legal climates.
  • Qualifications for outdoor education trip leaders should include demonstrated instructional skills, prior trip leading experience at the level contemplated, demonstrated good judgment and decision-making, prior field experience under a variety of conditions, wilderness first aid skills, and training in hazards evaluation and emergency situation management and response.
  • Staffing with unqualified or inexperienced leadership increases the risk to the participants.
  • Leader qualifications should be determined by terrain guidelines. The more complex the terrain, the more risk associated with the terrain, or the more technical the terrain, the more qualified the leadership should be.
  • High ratios of leadership to participants should be avoided.
  • A distinction should be made between leaders playing the role of “chaperones’ and those playing the role of trip leaders and instructors. 
  • The locations and level of activities should be adjusted to be commensurate with the qualifications and abilities of the activity leaders.
  • Commercial outdoor program providers differ from those providing program for non-profit groups (schools, etc.) in the following ways:  they work primarily with adults, there is a contractual relationship between the parties that is bargained for, the clients are more aware of the risks, clients voluntarily sign a waiver that waives their right to sue, and even in the event of fatalities, the business continues to operate to the same standard as before.
  • The position of society is that schools cannot operate to the same level as commercial providers, as schools cannot accept a level of catastrophic risk.  Schools need to operate under a higher standard of care and a lower tolerance of risk.  Schools may accordingly not be able to conduct activities using the same terrain as commercial operators. 
  • An outdoor education program requires that thought be given to the vision statement, program design, trip planning, trip approval processes, program governance, risk and decision-making.
  • Outdoor education programs should be appropriate for the age and maturity of the participants.
  • A decision-making module for outdoor recreation programs should include:  An initial decision to adopt an activity, an annual decision to keep an activity or program location, decisions made during the operational year (staffing requirements, etc), proximate decisions (14 days prior), and on-site decisions. 
  • Easy access to a program area (such as a backcountry ski area) does not equate to low risk.
  • Certain activities that may have increased risk should require specific policies and procedures, which activities include horseback riding, mountain biking, whitewater boating, ski touring, solo expeditions, SCUBA, mountaineering, and rock climbing.

Good comments all, being particularly applicable to the planning and conduct of Scouting activities! Safe Scouting!


What can be learned from tragedy?